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I.

INTRODUCTION

Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), a venture capitalist firm based
out of San Francisco, has been visiting with state and local governments
across the country.1 MRP proposed to these local governments that eminent
domain can, and should, be used to seize mortgages and refinance them in
an attempt to correct the United States’ foreclosure crisis.2 This is not the
first time this idea has been identified as a solution to the foreclosure crisis;3 it is, however, the first time that it has had the backing of a firm that
can assist financially with its implementation.4 San Bernardino County in

1.
An Eminently Bad Idea, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304299704577504631625599136.
2.
Id.
3.
See generally Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0925/p09s02-coop.html; Lauren E.
Willis, Stabilize Home Mortgage Borrowers, and the Financial System Will Follow, (Loyola-L.A. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 2008-28, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273268; Robert Hockett, Breaking the Mortgage Debt Impasse:
Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan
Modification, Value Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery, WALL ST. J.,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/EMINENT-legal-brief.pdf.
4.
See Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: Investors Tout Controversial “Condemnation” for Housing Fix, REUTERS, June 8, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/08/us-mortgages-condemnation-housingidUSBRE85719Z20120608.
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California was one local government that had been receptive to the plan.5
However, in January 2013, the county decided not to proceed any further
with the plan due to a lack of support from the community.6 Other local
governments across the country have also considered the proposal made by
MRP but have also not been receptive.7 In January 2013, the city of Brockton, Massachusetts “commission[ed] a study into the feasibility of using
eminent domain powers to seize the mortgages of local residents struggling
to pay off their loans.”8 There exists disagreement over implementation of
MRP’s plan across the country, because it involves many legal and policy
issues.9 This Comment attempts to identify and address the major legal and
policy concerns inherent in MRP’s proposal.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) stated in the Federal
Register on August 9, 2012 that:
FHFA has significant concerns about the use of
eminent domain to revise existing financial contracts and the alteration of the value of [Government Sponsored] Enterprise or Bank securities
holdings. In the case of the [Government Sponsored] Enterprises, resulting losses from such a
5.
Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched by
Other Struggling Communities, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 1, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1836710.html.
6.
Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage
Plan, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-eminentdomain-20130124,0,4577228.story.
7.
Mary Ellen Podmolik & John Byrne, Emanuel: Eminent Domain Not ‘the Right
Instrument’ to Address Underwater Mortgages, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2012,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-14/business/chi-emanuel-eminent-domain-notthe-right-instrument-to-address-underwater-mortgages-20120814_1_eminent-domainunderwater-homeowners-mortgages.
8.
Eleaszar David Melendez, Brockton, Massachusetts, Considering Eminent
Domain to Address Foreclosures, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/brockton-eminent-domainforeclosure_n_2458369.html.
9.
See generally Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Jonathan Hacker, and Matthew Close, to Secs. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n on San Bernardino Eminent Domain
Proposal (July 16, 2012), available at
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/issues/capital_markets/securitization/eminent_domain/m
emorandumfromo'melvenymyerstosifmaresanbernardinoeminentdomainproposal071612.pdf;
Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors
on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement (July 13, 2012), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_Eminent_Domain_Letter_7_13
_12.pdf; Andrew M. Grossman, San Bernardino Mortgage Seizure Plan Raises Serious
Constitutional Concerns, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 16, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2012/07/San-Bernardino-Mortgage-Seizure-PlanRaises-Serious-Constitutional-Concerns.

2013]

“CORRECTING” THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS?

program would represent a cost ultimately borne
by taxpayers. At the same time, FHFA has significant concerns with programs that could undermine
and have a chilling effect on the extension of credit
to borrowers seeking to become homeowners and
on investors that support the housing market.
FHFA has determined that action may be necessary
on its part as conservator for the [Government
Sponsored] Enterprises and as regulator for the
Banks to avoid a risk to safe and sound operations
and to avoid taxpayer expense. Among questions
raised regarding the proposed use of eminent domain are the constitutionality of such use; the application of federal and state consumer protection
laws; the effects on holders of existing securities;
the impact on millions of negotiated and performing mortgage contracts; the role of courts in administering or overseeing such a program, including
available judicial resources; fees and costs attendant to such programs; and, in particular, critical issues surrounding the valuation by local governments of complex contractual arrangements that
are traded in national and international markets.10

10.
Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans Notice, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,652 (Aug. 9, 2012). The United States Code defines “government-sponsored enterprise”
as follows:
For purposes of this Act . . . (8) The term “governmentsponsored enterprise” means a corporate entity created by a
law of the United States that
(A)
(i) has a Federal charter authorized by law; has a Federal
charter authorized by law;
(ii) is privately owned, as evidenced by capital stock owned
by private entities or individuals;
(iii) is under the direction of a board of directors, a majority
of which is elected by private owners;
(iv) is a financial institution with power to-(I) make loans or loan guarantees for limited purposes
such as to provide credit for specific borrowers or one sector; and
(II) raise funds by borrowing (which does not carry the full
faith and credit of the Federal Government) or to guarantee the debt of others in unlimited amounts; and
(B)
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Other prominent government officials have also expressed concern
about the plan.11 Rahm Emanuel, the Mayor of Chicago, stated, “I don’t
think it’s the right way to address the problem . . . . I think we have to address the issue. I just don’t think that’s the right instrument.”12 Of course,
there are also many supporters of the plan.13 Representative Brad Miller of
North Carolina stated, “[a] legal challenge by Wall Street [to MRP’s proposal] might be expensive to fight, but the arguments are pretty flimsy.”14
Still, there exists opposition to MRP’s proposal on both the local and federal level.15 Therefore, this Comment attempts to identify the major concerns
with MRP’s plan that lead to this opposition. Part II of this Comment provides a history of how increasing home prices, sub-prime lending, and
greed led to the foreclosure crisis that now requires a plan like MRP’s. Part
III elaborates on MRP’s proposal and how the plan is designed to correct
the foreclosure crisis. Part IV identifies the major legal and, more specifically, constitutional issues with the plan. Finally, Part V identifies policy
issues that would arise if the plan were implemented.
II.

HISTORY

The main reason local governments are even considering MRP’s proposal is because of the devastating effects the subprime mortgage crisis had,
and continues to have, on local communities and the United States in general, due to the foreclosure crisis that followed shortly after the subprime
(i) does not exercise powers that are reserved to the Government as sovereign (such as the power to tax or to regulate
interstate commerce);
(ii) does not have the power to commit the Government financially (but it may be a recipient of a loan guarantee
commitment made by the Government); and
(iii) has employees whose salaries and expenses are paid by
the enterprise and are not Federal employees subject to title
5 of the United States Code.
2 U.S.C.S § 622 (2012).
11.
Podmolik, supra note 7.
12.
Id.
13.
See Rep. Brad Miller, No Wonder Eminent Domain Mortgage Seizures Scare
Wall Street, AM. BANKER, July 11, 2012,
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/eminent-domain-mortgage-seizures-terrify-wallstreet-1050811-1.html; David Reiss, Eminently Reasonable, THE NAT’L L. J., Sept. 24, 2012,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202572203513&slreturn=20121012162
631; Robert J. Shiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/business/economy/real-estates-collective-actionproblem.html?_r=0.
14.
Miller, supra note 13.
15.
See Podmolik, supra note 7; Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing
Loans Notice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,652.
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mortgage crisis.16 “Many policy makers and ordinary people blame the rise
of foreclosures squarely on subprime mortgage lenders who presumably
misled borrowers into taking out complex loans at low initial interest
rates.”17 To understand why MRP’s proposal is so attractive to many local
governments, we must first examine the difference between a prime mortgage and a subprime mortgage.18
“The main difference between prime and subprime mortgages lies in
the risk profile of the borrower; subprime mortgages are offered to higherrisk borrowers.”19 The level of risk applied to a borrower is based on a variety of factors.20 These factors may include “previous bankruptcy filings,
debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, and the level of documentation provided by
the applicants to verify income.”21 Once the level of risk is determined, the
lender will next look at the borrower’s credit score and the initial payment
the borrower will be making.22 Once this is all compiled, a borrower will be
determined to be either high risk (a subprime borrower) or low risk (a prime
borrower).23 “Generally, subprime borrowers pay 200 to 300 basis points
above the prevailing prime rates.”24 There also exists one other subsection
of mortgage classification.25 Alt-A loans are a type of subprime loan but
consist of the lowest high-risk borrowers.26 “According to the Mortgage
16.
See Stephanie Armour, Foreclosure Crisis Spreads from Subprime to Prime
Mortgages, USA TODAY, June 9, 2009,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-06-08-home-loanforeclosures-subprime_N.htm.
17.
Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis: Zero Money Down,
Not Subprime Loans, Led to the Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124657539489189043.html (“[T]he focus on subprimes
ignores the widely available industry facts (reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association)
that 51% of all foreclosed homes had prime loans, not subprime, and that the foreclosure rate
for prime loans grew by 488% compared to a growth rate of 200% for subprime foreclosures.”).
18.
See Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd.
of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement 1, 2 (July 13, 2012), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_Eminent_Domain_Letter_7_13
_12.pdf.
19.
Sumit Agarwal & Calvin T. Ho, Comparing the Prime and Subprime Mortgage
Markets, CHICAGO FED LETTER (The Fed. Reserve Bank, Chicago, IL), Aug. 2007, at 1-2,
available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2007/cflaugust200
7_241.pdf.
20.
See id.
21.
Id.
22.
See id.
23.
See id.
24.
Agarwal & Ho, supra note 19.
25.
See id.
26.
See id.
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Bankers Association, prime mortgages make up about 80% of the mortgage
market, subprime mortgages about 15%, and Alt-A loans about 5%. These
figures represent the stock of mortgages outstanding as of 2006.”27
With the possibility of greater returns, the subprime mortgage market
grew greatly in the first decade of the twenty-first century.28 In 2002, only
6% of all loans created were subprime, but by 2006, over 20% of all mortgages created were subprime mortgages.29 However, with greater reward
came greater risk, and many mortgage issuers began to decrease their requirements for issuance of subprime mortgages.30 This was, in part, due to
the fact that, almost right after the subprime mortgage was issued, it was
bundled into a mortgage-backed security (MBS) and sold to another financial institution.31 Even worse, after being sold, the MBS could, and generally would, be repackaged and resold again as a collateralized debt obligation
(CDO).32 Therefore, the risk of default on the mortgages was also moved—
meaning the issuers of the mortgages had little to no incentive to check the
credit worthiness of the individuals they were issuing loans to because they
would be resold soon thereafter and became someone else’s problem.33
However, the issuers kept the origination fees and other fees.34 This all,
27.
Id.
28.
See id. at 2.
29.
Mortgage Market Statistical Annual 2006, INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, cited in Agarwal & Ho, supra note 19
30.
See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 423 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (stating that “[t]here was a
steady deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards (enabled by securitizers that lowered the credit quality of the mortgages they would accept, and credit rating agencies that
overrated the subsequent securities and derivatives). There was a contemporaneous increase
in mortgages that required little to no documentation”).
31.
See id. at 7 (“Under the radar, the lending and the financial services industry had
mutated. In the past, lenders had avoided making unsound loans because they would be
stuck with them in their loan portfolios. But because of the growth of securitization, it
wasn’t even clear anymore who the lender was. The mortgages would be packaged, sliced,
repackaged, insured, and sold as incomprehensibly complicated debt securities to an assortment of hungry investors. Now even the worst loans could find a buyer.”).
32.
See id. at 8 (“The firms would package the loans into residential mortgage–
backed securities that would mostly be stamped with triple-A ratings by the credit rating
agencies, and sold to investors. In many cases, the securities were repackaged again into
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)—often composed of the riskier portions of these
securities—which would then be sold to other investors.”).
33.
See id. at 10.
34.
See id. (“James Rokakis, the longtime county treasurer of Cuyahoga County,
where Cleveland is located, told the Commission that the region’s housing market was
juiced by ‘flipping on mega-steroids,’ with rings of real estate agents, appraisers, and loan
originators earning fees on each transaction and feeding the securitized loans to Wall
Street.”).
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arguably, came to a head on August 9, 2007 “when BNP Paribas stopped
withdrawals from three investment funds because it could not value their
holdings, and in particular their subprime-mortgage assets.”35 BNP and
other investors could not value these holdings because “[a]s investors tried
to delve into the details of the value of CDO assets and the reliability of
their cash flows, the extraordinary complexity of the instruments provided a
significant impediment to insight into the underlying financial data.”36
The subprime mortgage financial instruments were difficult, if not impossible, to value because Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) began requiring fair value accounting in 2007.37 Therefore,
In the first quarter of 2007, the largest banks and
investment banks began complying with a new accounting rule and for the first time reported their
assets in one of three valuation categories: “Level 1
assets,” which had observable market prices, like
stocks on the stock exchange; “Level 2 assets,”
which were not as easily priced because they were
not actively traded; and “Level 3 assets,” which
were illiquid and had no discernible market prices
or other inputs. To determine the value of Level 3
and in some cases Level 2 assets where market
prices were unavailable, firms used models that relied on assumptions. Many financial institutions
reported Level 3 assets that substantially exceeded
their capital.38
Because many of the subprime mortgage instruments had never been
based on “observable inputs,” companies holding these instruments had to
apply valuation models based only upon information they had at their disposal, forcing them to apply massive write-downs to their holdings of subprime mortgage instruments.39 This was in large part due to the fact that the
underwriters of the mortgages had become lax in their requirements, and
therefore, the cash flows that supposedly existed for some of the subprime
35.
A.P., The Financial Crisis: Unhappy Birthday, ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/08/financial-crisis.
36.
Michael R. Young et al., The Role of Fair Value Accounting in the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, J. OF ACCT., May 2008,
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2008/May/TheNeedforReliabilityinAccountin
g.htm.
37.
See Summary of Statement No. 157, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum157.shtml (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
38.
See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 30, at 226.
39.
See Young, supra note 36.
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financial instruments did not exist, forcing companies to write-down these
assets to their actual value.40 These write-downs on subprime mortgage
instruments led to “commercial banks’ earnings declin[ing] to a 16-year
low.”41 With massive asset write-downs required and earnings stifled at the
largest of banks, liquidity became a major issue in the market.42 “[T]he loss
of liquidity in the financial sector was making it more difficult for business
and consumers to get credit . . . .”43
Also, around early 2007, and even earlier in some areas of the country,
it was beginning to become clear that many of the subprime mortgages that
had been issued to homebuyers would not be able to be paid by the homebuyers.44 The lax requirements of many of the issuers of mortgages were
beginning to catch up with the issuers as many mortgagors became delinquent on their payments soon after their mortgage was given to them.45
Consequently, this led to the inability for investors to determine the actual
value of many of the subprime mortgage financial instruments, because the
cash flows that had been promised had now disappeared.46 With payments
on subprime mortgages nonexistent, massive write-downs being required,
and liquidity in the market gone, the subprime mortgage and subsequent
foreclosure crisis had begun in earnest.47
In a spring 2010 survey, 85% of the responding
mayors ranked the prevalence of nonprime or subprime mortgages as either first or second on a list
of factors causing foreclosures in their cities. Almost all the mayors, 92%, said they expected the
foreclosure problems to stay the same or worsen in
their cities over the next year.48

40.
See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 30, at 423.
41.
Id. at 301.
42.
See id. at 274-75.
43.
Id. at 274-75.
44.
See id. at 215.
45.
See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 30, at 215.
46.
See id. at 406. See also Young, supra note 36.
47.
See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 30, at 215, 274-275,402 (“Prior to 2007, the foreclosure rate was historically less than 1%. But the trend since the housing
market collapsed has been dramatic: In 2009, 2.2% of all houses, or 1 out of 45, received at
least one foreclosure filing.”); Young, supra note 36.
48.
THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, IMPACT OF THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
CRISIS ON VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES IN CITIES: A 77-CITY SURVEY 3-4 (June
2010), cited in THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 30, at 403.
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MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNER’S PROPOSAL

With the background of the devastating effects that the subprime
mortgage crisis and foreclosure crisis have had on the United States’ economy, we will now turn in more detail to MRP’s proposal to correct the
foreclosure crisis through the use of eminent domain. To reiterate, MRP is a
venture capitalist firm based in San Francisco.49 Evercore Partners and
Westwood Capital LLC advise MRP.50 Evercore Partners and Westwood
Capital LLC are investment banking advisory firms.51
MRP’s plan begins with the identification of current, but underwater,
mortgages.52 An “underwater” mortgage exists when a mortgagor owes
more to the mortgagee than the property is worth on the market.53 A “current” mortgage is one where the mortgagor is not in default.54 “Mortgage
default is defined to occur when homeowners are delinquent on their payments by one month or more.”55 Therefore, for MRP to be targeting current
but underwater mortgages means that MRP desires to target mortgages
where the mortgagor is making payments on time but will be paying an
amount beyond what that property is currently worth.56 Underwater mortgagors are commonly referred to as having “negative equity” in their property.57 Having “negative equity” simply means that the mortgagor owes
more on a mortgage than the property giving rise to the mortgage is
worth.58 Whether it is called being underwater or having negative equity,

49.
An Eminently Bad Idea, supra note 1.
50.
Shahien Nasirpour & Tom Braithwaite, US Housing Plan Aims to Woo Bondholders, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b4305aa4-07ea-11e2a2d8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2A3YBGBHl.
51.
Overview, EVERCORE, http://www.evercore.com/about (last visited Jan. 6,
2013); Who We Are, WESTWOOD CAPITAL, http://www.westwoodcapital.com/whoweare/
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
52.
Al Yoon, Seizing Mortgages Could Yield Big Returns, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443295404577547243807191280.html.
53.
See Les Christie, Underwater Borrowers Are on the Rise, CNN MONEY (Mar. 1,
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/01/real_estate/underwater_borrowers/index.htm.
54.
See Frequently Asked Questions, MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS 1, 8 (2012),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/EMINENT-faqs.pdf.
55.
Wenli Li & Michelle J. White, Mortgage Default, Foreclosures and Bankruptcy
in the Context of the Financial Crisis, INT’L MONETARY FUND 3 (Paper presented at the 10th
Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, Washington, D.C.) (Nov. 5-6, 2009),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2009/arc/pdf/li.pdf.
56.
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 54, at 8.
57.
Can’t Pay or Won’t Pay?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.economist.com/node/13145239?story_id=13145239.
58.
See id.
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these are the types of mortgages that MRP is looking to target based on
their proposal.59
Once select current but underwater mortgages have been identified, it
will be determined whether they are privately owned mortgages.60 MRP
states that they will be “emphasizing loans held by private-label securitization trusts.”61 To understand what this means, an explanation of mortgagebacked securities (MBS) is required. MBS are:
[D]ebt obligations that represent claims to the cash
flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are
purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and
other originators and then assembled into pools by
a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues securities that represent
claims on the principal and interest payments made
by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process
known as securitization.62
Therefore, a securitization trust is created when a “mortgage security
issuer . . . segregates the collateral or deposits it in the care of a designated
trustee, a party who holds and manages the collateral for the exclusive benefit of the mortgage security bondholders.”63 Private-label mortgage securities are issued by private companies that generally do not meet certain requirements and are, therefore, “the sole obligation of their issuer and are not
guaranteed by one of the [Government Sponsored Enterprises] or the U.S.
Government.”64
After MRP has identified the private-label mortgage securities they
wish to target, they will then receive funding from investors that will be
used to purchase the mortgages in eminent domain proceedings.65 In many
states, such as Illinois, “quick-take” eminent domain proceedings exist that
allow MRP to gain ownership of selected mortgages faster than under nor59.
60.
61.

An Eminently Bad Idea, supra note 1.
See id.
Homeownership Protection Program: A Solution to a Critical Problem,
MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS 9 (2012),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/EMINENT-powerpoint.pdf.
62.
Mortgage-Back Securities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
63.
About MBS/ABS: Agency vs. Private Label, INVESTINGINBONDS.COM,
http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=11&subcatid=56&id=134 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
64.
Id.
65.
See Homeownership Protection Program, supra note 61, at 12.
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mal eminent domain proceedings.66 In Illinois, certain criteria are required
to be met before a “quick-take” will be successful.67 More specifically, in
Illinois, a “quick-take” requires “the motion for taking [to state] . . . the
necessity for taking the property in the manner requested in the motion.”68
It has been stated, “[t]his requirement is due to the fact that the exercise of
quick take power is an even more drastic procedure than the usual eminent
domain proceedings because of the immediate vesting of title in the sovereign entity.”69
MRP plans to use “quick-take” proceedings where available because it
allows them “to purchase the loan first and finally determine fair value later.”70 Once MRP has acquired the mortgages they have targeted in “quicktake” proceedings, they will pay the value for the mortgages that the court
has decided upon.71 The mortgages will then be transferred from the
“[t]rustee/mortgagee . . . for cash consideration.”72 Because the mortgages
were taken in “quick-take” proceedings, another hearing will be held before
the court at some point post-transfer to determine if the amount previously
provided for the mortgages was fair.73 If the previous compensation is
deemed inadequate, the government, who will be repaid by MRP, will pay
any remaining amount deemed required by the court.74 In either event,
whether the government has to pay more for the mortgages or not, the government now owns the mortgages, and MRP will begin the refinancing process.75
The process of refinancing the new mortgages will require underwriting the mortgages once again.76 Mortgage underwriting is simply the
“[p]rocess of evaluating the credit characteristics of a mortgage and borrower.”77 MRP stated that they “will [be] determin[ing] the underwriting
criteria for selecting loans based on the requirements of third party lenders,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FHA, and other parties who will ultimately
66.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/20-5-5 (2012).
67.
See id.
68.
Id.
69.
Dep’t of Transp. ex. rel. People v. First Galesburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 189
Ill. App. 3d 797, 801 (3d Dist. 1989) (emphasis added).
70.
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 54, at 3.
71.
See Homeownership Protection Program, supra note 61, at 12.
72.
See id.
73.
See id.
74.
See id.
75.
See id.
76.
See Clea Benson, FHA Said to Set Sage for Treasury Draw as Losses Mount,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/fha-said-to-setstage-for-treasury-draw-as-losses-mount.html (“[R]efinanc[ing] under FHA’s streamline
program . . . waives many underwriting requirements [which] enable[s] borrowers to take
advantage of low interest rates.”).
77.
THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 30, at 542.
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acquire, refinance or guarantee the loans.”78 MRP also states that they “will
not refinance or modify loans for borrowers who do not qualify. [They] will
manage credit risk through underwriting to the requirements of third party
lenders and guarantors . . . .”79 Finally, “[t]he loans [will] then be sold to
hedge funds, pension funds, or other investors, with the proceeds being
used to pay off outside financiers secured by MRP, who are funding the
eminent domain process.”80 Of course, MRP is not performing this service
for free and will be “tak[ing] a $4,500 fee for each loan seized and modified.”81
IV.

LEGAL ISSUES

Multiple legal issues exist with respect to MRP’s plan as it is currently
conceived.82 What follows is an examination of some of the more concerning legal issues with MRP’s current proposals.
A.

TAKINGS CLAUSE

To begin, we must first examine whether mortgages can even be taken
through eminent domain. Generally, when people speak of eminent domain,
the first thought that comes to mind is the government taking tangible physical property from a private owner rather than intangible property such as
loans or mortgages.83 However, eminent domain proceedings can, in fact,
be implemented against intangible property.84 In West River Bridge Company v. Dix, the Supreme Court stated:
A distinction has been attempted, in argument, between the power of a government to appropriate for
public uses property which is corporeal, or may be
said to be in being, and the like power in the gov78.
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 54, at 7.
79.
Id.
80.
See Joe Nelson, Arguments Over Eminent Domain Mortgage Seizure Program
Ramp up for 2013, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.sbsun.com/ci_22105597/arguments-over-eminent-domain-mortgage-seizureprogram-ramp?source=most_viewed.
81.
Id.
82.
See generally Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 1.; Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers
Agreement (July 13, 2012), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_Eminent_Domain_Letter_7_13
_12.pdf; Grossman, supra note 9.
83.
See Miller, supra note 13 (“Eminent domain is commonly used to buy land for
projects like roads and schools.”).
84.
See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1848).
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ernment to resume or extinguish a franchise. The
distinction thus attempted we regard as a refinement which has no foundation in reason, and one
that, in truth, avoids the true legal or constitutional
question in these causes; namely, that of the right
in private persons, in the use or enjoyment of their
private property, to control and actually to prohibit
the power and duty of the government to advance
and protect the general good. We are aware of
nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class it
higher, or render it more sacred, than other property. A franchise is property, and nothing more; it is
incorporeal property. . . .85
This sentiment was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court over 100 years
later in Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S.86 Additionally, in City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders the California Supreme Court stated, “[f]or eminent domain purposes, neither the federal nor the state Constitution distinguishes
between property which is real or personal, tangible or intangible.”87 Therefore, it is clear that intangible property, such as mortgages, is completely
within the authority of a state or local government to take through eminent
domain proceedings.88 With the ability of state and local governments to
take intangible property such as mortgages in mind, we must now turn to
other issues with MRP’s plan that are of concern.
1.

Public Use

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”89 As James Madison stated in Property,
“[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that
which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is a just gov-

85.
West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. at 533-34 (emphasis added).
86.
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (“[T]he intangible
acquires a value to a potential purchaser no different from the value of the business’ physical
property.”). See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 68 (1982).
87.
City of Oakland, 32 Cal. 3d at 68.
88.
See West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. at 533. See also Kimball Laundry Co., 338
U.S. at 11; City of Oakland, 32 Cal. 3d at 68.
89.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ernment, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”90
Therefore, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that “(1) [a]ny taking must
be for a ‘public use,’ and (2) the government must provide the property’s
owner ‘just compensation’” helps to “impose two substantive limitations on
the use of eminent domain.”91 With this general background in mind, we
now turn to the MRP proposal and consider the application of the Takings
Clause to the plan.
The most recent and important case involving the Takings Clause was
Kelo v. City of New London, which was decided in 2005.92 In Kelo, the
Court stated, “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party
B, even though A is paid just compensation.”93 It would seem apparent that
MRP’s plan, as currently constructed, would do exactly what is not allowed
under the Takings Clause—that is, primarily taking mortgages from one
private party and giving them to another private party.94 The Court in Kelo
did hold that the transfer from party A to party B was constitutional in the
previously discussed situation because the transfer was but one of multiple
actions taken as part of a comprehensive development plan.95 Therefore, it
would appear as though, if MRP had as part of its proposal a comprehensive plan, the transfer would be allowed.96 The issue is that MRP does not
have a comprehensive plan and instead “the one-to-one property transfer is
not just one component of an integrated program . . . the systematic transfer
of property from A to B is the scheme itself.”97 Furthermore, “[MRP’s] proposal addresses properties one at a time (rather than in a comprehensive
fashion).”98 However, it could also easily be argued that MRP’s plan is, in
fact, a “comprehensive plan” as, in the aggregate, the plan calls for the taking of multiple mortgages concurrently, over time, in specific local communities that choose to implement the proposed plan.99

90.
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON DIGITAL EDITION (J. C. A. Stagg, ed., Charlotesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda 2010), available at Northern Illinois University Libraries (emphasis omitted).
91.
Douglas W. Kmiec, Takings Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONST.,
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/5/essays/151/takings-clause, cited in
Grossman, supra note 9.
92.
See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
93.
See id. at 477.
94.
See id.; An Eminently Bad Idea, supra note 1 (stating that mortgages would be
purchased, refinanced, and sold to other investors); Grossman, supra note 9, at 2.
95.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84.
96.
See id.
97.
Dellinger, supra note 9, at 1, 4.
98.
Grossman, supra note 9, at 2.
99.
See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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Even if it was determined that MRP’s plan was not an unconstitutional
transfer of property from party A to party B, outside of a comprehensive
plan, MRP’s proposal might still fail to meet the first requirement under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the plan lacks the requirement of a public purpose.100 The most logical argument that could be
made as to why MRP’s plan satisfies the public purpose requirement is that
the plan attempts to stop blight in the local community.101 The issue here is
that “blight” has different definitions and treatment depending on in which
state the taking is occurring:102 “[b]light is so broadly defined in many
states it gives the government almost unlimited power to use eminent domain.”103 In Illinois, for example:
A “blighted or slum area” means any area [that] . . .
has been designated by municipal ordinance or by
the Authority as an integrated project for rehabilitation, development or redevelopment, where (a)
buildings or improvements, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary
facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land
use or layout or any combination of these factors,
are a detriment to public safety, health or morals,
or welfare.104
This type of broad statutory definition of “blight” provides Illinois
with almost limitless authority to exercise eminent domain to stop or control blight, and therefore, it would appear as though MRP’s plan would be
feasible in Illinois as well as in other states with equally broad definitions
of blight.105 However, even when applying one of the broader definitions of
“blight,” as Illinois does, MRP’s proposal may still be unconstitutional as it
is currently constructed, because it has been alleged by opponents to the
plan that the plan attempts to prevent blight in the future rather than correct

100.
See id. at 478.
101.
See Hockett, supra note 3.
102.
See Nathan Koppel, There Goes the Neighborhood: A Fight Over Defining
‘Blight’, WALL ST. J., April 30, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124105581784671561.html.
103.
See id. (quoting Prof. D. Benjamin Barros).
104.
310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9 (2012).
105.
See Id.; Koppel, supra note 102.

16

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 5

current blighted areas.106 As stated earlier, MRP’s plan calls for purchasing
current but underwater mortgages.107 MRP has stated:
The purpose of acquiring and resolving underwater
loans is to protect neighbors and the broader community from defaults, foreclosures, and the losses
that they cause. The Federal Housing Finance
Agency has concluded that the single best way to
reduce losses is to proactively fix loans that are
current, deeply underwater, and securitized. Once a
borrower stops paying, the ability to mitigate loss
falls dramatically. Each local government has the
power to determine whether to acquire loans, and if
so which loans. It might rightly purchase loans that
are current, delinquent or in default. It chooses the
public goals and methods that it wants to pursue —
not private financial interests who want taxpayers
to bail them out of their holdings of defaulted
loans.108
Looked at through a business perspective, MRP’s proposal to select
current but underwater mortgages is a good idea for both the government
and MRP.109 But opponents argue that, constitutionally, the concept of selecting property that is currently not blighted to prevent blight in the future
is a tenuous proposition to support legally.110 Opponents of the plan point to
99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, where the court
stated, “[defendant’s] ‘public use’ theory fails for another independent reason. [Defendant] can point to no authority—and the Court could find none
—supporting its novel legal proposition that the prevention of ‘future
blight’ is a legitimate public use.”111 The court went on to state, “[i]n [de-

106.
See Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 4; Memorandum from Am. Securitization
Forum on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
supra note 9, at 7; 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9 (2012).
107.
See An Eminently Bad Idea, supra note 1.
108.
Fact or Fiction, MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS,
http://mortgageresolution.com/fact-or-fiction (last visited January 6, 2013).
109.
See An Eminently Bad Idea, supra note 1 (“[T]he government has every economic incentive to underpay the investor who owns the mortgage to cover transaction costs
and boost return for itself and MRP.”).
110.
See Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 4; Memorandum from Am. Securitization
Forum on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
supra note 9, at 7.
111.
99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001). See Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 4; Memorandum from
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fendant’s] view, then, no redevelopment site can ever be truly free from
blight because blight remains ever latent, ready to surface at any time. Such
an untenable position . . . defies logic.”112 MRP’s plan calls for the taking of
mortgages that may, but have not yet, contributed to “blight” in the local
community.113 Therefore, as the plan is currently conceived, the plan may
be an unconstitutional taking, because it does not meet the “public use”
requirement of the Takings Clause.114 However, considering that many
states have broad definitions of blight, the issue of “future blight” versus
“current blight” may be an irrelevant argument, as any minor imperfection
on a property may constitute current blight.115 Therefore, MRP’s plan could
conceivably survive a constitutional challenge under the Fifth Amendment
that alleged the plan lacks a public purpose in states like Illinois with broad
definitions of blight.116
Furthermore, recently, in a comment letter to the FHFA, MRP stated:
“MRP will [be] expand[ing] the services it provides to cover all PLS loans,
not just those that are current.”117 Legally, the expansion of MRP’s proposal
to include all private label security (PLS) mortgages would surely bring the
plan within the provisions of a “public use,” as all PLS loans would certainly include mortgages of blighted properties.118 However, only time will tell
if, upon actual implementation of MRP’s plan, both current and non-current
mortgages will be targeted for seizure.119

Am. Securitization Forum on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement to San Bernardino Cnty.
Bd. of Supervisors, supra note 9, at 7.
112.
99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
113.
See Fact or Fiction, supra note 108; 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at
1130-31; Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 4; Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum
on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, supra
note 9, at 7.
114.
See Fact or Fiction, supra note 108; 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at
1130-31; Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 4; Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum
on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, supra
note 9, at 7.
115.
See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9 (2012); Koppel, supra note 102 (quoting Prof. D.
Benjamin Barros).
116.
See 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9 (2012); Koppel, supra note 102 (quoting Prof. D.
Benjamin Barros).
117.
Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners, to Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency
on Federal Register Notice No. 2012-N-11 1, 5 (Sept. 7, 2012), available at
http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/sites/default/files/attachments/fhfa_comment_letter_9
.7.12.pdf.
118.
See David Streitfeld, Blight Moves in After Foreclosures, L.A. TIMES,
http://www.latimes.com/la-fi-vacant28aug28,0,7927104.story?page=1 (last visited Jan. 6,
2013).
119.
See Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners, to Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency on Federal Register Notice No. 2012-N-11, supra note 117, at 5.
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Just Compensation

The next issue with MRP’s proposal, with respect to the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is that the
plan arguably does not provide current mortgage holders with “just compensation.”120 In United States v. Miller, the Court stated that just compensation is “the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken.
The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have
occupied if the property had not been taken.”121 The Court went on to state
that “[i]n an effort . . . to find some practical standard, the courts early
adopted, and have retained, the concept of market value. The owner . . . [is]
. . . entitled to the ‘value,’ the ‘market value,’ and the ‘fair market value’ of
what is taken.”122 Therefore, “[u]nder this standard, the owner is entitled to
receive ‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the
time of the taking.”123
As previously stated, MRP’s plan is based on the assumption that
“[l]oans and liens will be acquired through eminent domain at fair value,
which is expected to be less than the market value of the home.”124 MRP’s
plan most likely calls for a price less than the market value of the home
because the government and MRP would need to “cover transaction costs
and boost returns for itself and MRP.”125 However, “MRP President Steve
Gluckstern [has] . . . argued that the fair market value MRP would pay is
the very value Fannie assigned its securities in financial filing disclosures,
based on the amount of loans expected to default.”126 Therefore, this valuation may in fact be the fair or market value for the assets and, therefore,
satisfies the requirement of “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.127 The next issue that must now be analyzed with
respect to MRP’s proposal is application of the Contracts Clause.
B.

CONTRACTS CLAUSE

The Constitution of the United States provides in Article 1, Section 10,
Clause 1 that, “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obliga120.
See Grossman, supra note 82, at 2.
121.
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1942).
122.
Id. at 374.
123.
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (citing Miller,
317 U.S. at 374-75).
124.
Homeownership Protection Program, supra note 61, at 9.
125.
See An Eminently Bad Idea, supra note 1.
126.
Jon Prior, Still No Partner for Radical Mortgage Resolution, POLITICO Jan. 16,
2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/still-no-partner-for-radical-mortgageresolution-86233.html.
127.
See id.; 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511; Miller, 317 U.S. at 373-74.
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tion of Contracts . . . .”128 As James Madison explained in The Federalist
No. 44, this clause was included in the Constitution as added protection for
the public.129 He stated, “laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle
of sound legislation . . . additional fences against these dangers ought not to
be omitted. Very properly therefore have the Convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of . . . private rights.”130
With this background in mind, the question then becomes whether
MRP’s proposal in fact violates the Contract Clause.131 In response to questions already being raised about the constitutionality of the plan with respect to the Contract Clause, MRP stated on July 15, 2012, “[i]n Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court both considered and, decisively for
present purposes, unanimously rejected the argument that eminent domain
takings can violate the Contract Clause.”132 However, this “decisive” rejection that MRP references is footnote 6 of the opinion, which states, “the
Contract Clause has never been thought to protect against the exercise of
the power of eminent domain.”133 In reading the footnote, it clearly is not as
“decisive” a rejection as MRP claims.134 It is hard to conclude that phrasing
that includes the term “thought” could be considered a “decisive” ruling on
a particular matter.135 Furthermore, footnotes are generally considered only
dictum.136 As stated in Henderson v. Morgan, “new rules of constitutional
law are not established in dicta in footnotes.”137 For these reasons, it is currently ambiguous whether the Contract Clause applies to eminent domain.138 For argument’s sake, we will assume the Contract Clause does
apply to eminent domain for the moment.139 Therefore, an analysis of the
constitutionality of MRP’s proposal under the Contract Clause is required.
The Supreme Court created, in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. The
Kansas Power and Light Company, a three-part test to determine when a
128.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
129.
See TERRENCE BALL, FEDERALIST WITH LETTERS OF BRUTUS 218 (Cambridge
University Press 2003). ,
130.
Id.
131.
See Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd.
of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement, supra note 18, at 8.
132.
Of Course They Can!, MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS,
http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/jones-day-response (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
133.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 n. 6 (1984) (emphasis added).
134.
See id.; Of Course They Can!, supra note 132.
135.
See Of Course They Can!, supra note 132.
136.
See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 651; Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S.
236, 259 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What the Court relies upon is the mere dictum,
rendered in the course of this opinion (and dictum in a footnote, at that).”).
137.
Henderson, 426 U.S. at 651.
138.
See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 243 n.6; Henderson, 426 U.S. at 651.
139.
See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 243 n.6; Henderson, 426 U.S. at 651.
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contract has been impaired.140 The Court stated, “[t]he threshold inquiry is
‘whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship.’”141 Next, “[i]f the state regulation constitutes a
substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant
and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation such as the remedying
of a broad and general social or economic problem.”142 Finally, “[o]nce a
legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether
the adjustment of ‘the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is
based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the
public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.’”143
Therefore, to determine if MRP’s plan violates the Contract Clause,
the Supreme Court’s three-part test must first be applied to the proposed
plan.144 In applying step one under the Energy Reserves Group, Inc. test, it
would appear as though MRP’s proposal would “operate as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship.”145 MRP’s plan appears to impair
contractual rights because, as the plan states, “[l]oans and liens will be acquired through eminent domain at fair value, which is expected to be less
than the market value of the home.”146 Since the mortgage holders entered
into a contract for one price and MRP’s plan would unilaterally decrease
that price, it is apparent that these contracts would be impaired if MRP’s
plan were implemented.147 Furthermore, the mortgages would be substantially impaired based on the large discrepancy between fair value and market value in the current market.148Although MRP’s plan may constitute a
“substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,” it could still be
deemed constitutional if it serves “a significant and legitimate public purpose.”149 As stated earlier, the question of whether the plan does or does not
serve a public purpose or use is up for debate.150
Assuming a court did find MRP’s plan serves a public purpose, the
plan could still be unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause.151 The ad140.
See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
411-13 (1983).
141.
Id. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244
(1978)).
142.
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted).
143.
Id. at 412 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
144.
See id. at 411-13.
145.
See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)).
146.
Homeownership Protection Program, supra note 61, at 9.
147.
See id.
148.
See id.
149.
Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 411-13.
150.
See supra Part IV.A.
151.
See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 412.
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justment that would occur via the seizure of underwater mortgages would
clearly not be based on “reasonable conditions” nor be of “appropriate
character.”152 This type of adjustment would seem to only be on “reasonable conditions” and be of “appropriate character” if it were the last resort to
correcting the foreclosure crisis.153 The federal government has taken (via
Independent Foreclosure Review)154 and continues (via National Mortgage
Settlement) to take action in an attempt to correct the foreclosure crisis.155
These measures are not nearly as radical as the use of eminent domain.156
However, many have argued that these measures have also been entirely
ineffective.157 Only once all other options have been exhausted would a
court most likely conclude that this final part of the Energy Reserve Group
test had been satisfied.158 Until then, it appears that MRP’s proposal may
violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution if implemented by a local or state government and is therefore possibly unconstitutional.159 However, one commentator has stated that the test under Energy Reserve Group is a fairly deferential approach to application of the Contracts
Clause.160 Therefore, it is also quite possible that a court would determine
that if a local government were to implement MRP’s plan it would not violate the Contracts Clause.161
C.

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

MRP’s plan may also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.162 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United
States Constitution provides that “[c]ongress shall have Power . . . To regu152.
153.
154.

Id.
See id.
See What You Need to Know: Independent Foreclosure Review, BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (July 26, 2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/independent-foreclosure-review.htm.
155.
See National Mortgage Settlement, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST.
(Dec. 17, 2012, 10:26 AM),
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/consumer_info/nms/index.htm.
156.
See Jennifer Medina, California County Weighs Drastic Plan to Aid Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/us/a-county-considersrescue-of-underwater-homes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
157.
See Bill Whitaker, Some Relief for Victims of Foreclosure, CBS NEWS, Dec. 28,
2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57561192/some-relief-for-victims-offoreclosures/.
158.
See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 412.
159.
See id.
160.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 955 (Richard A. Epstein, et
al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
161.
See id.
162.
See Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd.
of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement, supra note 18, at 7.
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late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes . . . .”163 Courts in the United States have, over time,
inferred a power from this clause, which has come to be known as the
“Dormant Commerce Clause.”164 In Welton v. Missouri, the Supreme Court
stated, “[t]he fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific
rules to govern inter-State commerce does not affect the question. Its inaction on this subject . . . is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and untrammelled [sic].”165 “The case most frequently
cited for the contemporary analysis of burden on interstate commerce is
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.”166 In Pike, the Court created a balancing test to
determine when a non-facially discriminatory regulation violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause.167 The Court stated:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues
but more frequently it has spoken in terms of "direct" and “indirect” effects and burdens.168
This test appears to have been used in City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders to determine whether a sports franchise could be seized via eminent
domain without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.169 The court held
that, “[the City of Oakland’s] proposed action would more than indirectly
or incidentally regulate interstate commerce . . . . This is the precise brand
of parochial meddling with the national economy that the commerce clause
163.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164.
Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1468, 1472 (2007).
165.
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875) (emphasis added).
166.
3 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 43.24 (West Group 2d ed. 1997).
167.
See 8A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G22.03 at 4 (3d ed. 2013).
168.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted).
169.
See 8A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G22.03 at 4 (3d ed. 2013).
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was designed to prohibit.”170 If the court in City of Oakland held that a
sports franchise could not be seized via eminent domain, proponents of
MRP’s plan would be hard pressed to showcase how the seizure of mortgages would not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.171 In addition,
“MRP’s proposal specifically targets mortgage loans that have been securitized in out-of-state transactions to back securities traded in interstate commerce . . . . [Therefore,] [t]he effect and burden on interstate commerce
would be intentional and direct, rather than only ‘incidental’ or ‘indirect.’”172 Based on the current legal landscape, with respect to the use of
eminent domain to seize intangible assets, it is unlikely that MRP’s plan
would be found to be constitutional and not a violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.173
V.

POLICY CONCERNS

In addition to the legal issues that exist with respect to MRP’s proposal to seize underwater mortgages via the use of eminent domain, there
are also multiple policy issues that must be considered if the plan were implemented.174 As mentioned earlier, the FHFA in particular has multiple
concerns with MRP’s current plan.175
A.

“CHILLING EFFECT”

The FHFA is primarily concerned that the use of eminent domain
would, as they state, have a “chilling effect on the extension of credit to
borrowers seeking to become homeowners and on investors that support the
housing market.”176 Additionally, the FHFA is concerned that if the plan
was implemented and losses occurred, taxpayers would be liable for any
losses with respect to Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) assets.177

170.
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (1985).
171.
See id.; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
172.
Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement, supra note 18, at 8. See also Dellinger
et al., supra note 9, at 10 (stating that “the proposal would permit the JPA to seize notes held
in trust outside the state”).
173.
See City of Oakland, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
174.
See Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,652 (Aug. 9, 2012).
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
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The FHFA is not the only entity that is concerned with the implementation of MRP’s proposal on the housing market.178 Multiple trade organizations and forums have also spoken out against MRP’s plan.179 The American Securitization Forum (ASF) stated on July 13, 2012, “even in the most
challenging of economic times, poor policy solutions such as the proposal
to seize mortgage loans through eminent domain are not productive or legal
answers.”180 This statement was reiterated again by ASF as recently as December 16, 2012 in an open memorandum to the Salinas City Council.181
The Securities Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA) has
also expressed disapproval of MRP’s plan.182 SIFMA stated in an open
memorandum to Treasury Secretary Honorable Timothy Geithner that:
Unfortunately, some investment groups and academics have recently been advocating for the use
of the sovereign power of eminent domain to seize
individual underwater mortgages from established
private-label securitization pools. As you are no
178.
See generally Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement , supra note 18; Dellinger
et al., supra note 9; Memorandum from Am. for Prosperity, to the Office of Gen. Counsel
for the Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans
(Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24283/9_Americans_for_Prosperity_Foundation.pdf; Memorandum from the Undersigned Orgs. to the Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans (Sept. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.aba.com/advocacy/letterstocongress/documents/mortgage-ed-jointletter090712.pdf.
179.
See generally Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement , supra note 18; Dellinger
et al., supra note 9; Memorandum from Am. for Prosperity, to the Office of Gen. Counsel
for the Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans
(Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24283/9_Americans_for_Prosperity_Foundation.pdf; Memorandum from the Undersigned Orgs. to the Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans (Sept. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.aba.com/advocacy/letterstocongress/documents/mortgage-ed-jointletter090712.pdf.
180.
Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, supra note 18, at 1.
181.
See Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to Salinas City Council on
Use of Eminent Domain to Seize and Restructure Mortgage Loans 1, 1 (Dec. 16, 2012),
available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/content.aspx?id=8651 (“Even in the
most challenging of economic times, however, poor policy solutions such as the proposal to
seize mortgage loans through eminent domain are not productive or legal answers.”).
182.
See Memorandum from Secs. Indus. and Fin. Market Ass’n, to the Honorable
Timothy Geithner on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans 1, 1-2 (Aug.
27, 2012), available at http://www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589940087.
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doubt aware, the County of San Bernardino, California, is considering a plan under which it would
exercise eminent domain to seize performing underwater mortgages, transfer the mortgages to new
private investors who would restructure the mortgages by writing down the outstanding principle
and then selling the mortgages through FHA or
Ginnie Mae programs. The proposal is inherently
based on paying the current mortgage owners far
less than the true value of these performing mortgages and transferring this additional value to the
new private investors. Similar proposals are being
considered in other jurisdictions across the country.
However, given the inherent flaws in this approach, many legal analysts, investors, banks, trade
associations, and thoughtful public officials, including Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel and Federal Housing Agency Acting Director Edward
DeMarco have expressed grave concern.183
A similar open memorandum was also sent to Honorable Martin J.
Gruenberg, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).184 Both ASF and SIFMA have the same or similar concerns with
MRP’s proposal as the FHFA.185 The so-called “chilling effect” is the predominant concern of the aforementioned organizations and agencies.186
SIFMA has stated that:
Adoption of this, or similar, eminent domain approaches would have an immediate impact on the
short and long-term interests of those who have
long financed our mortgage markets – bankers, individual investors, pension funds, insurance companies, and many others. We should not forget that
a deep and liquid mortgage market in the United
States has long been a sound foundation for much
183.
Id.
184.
See Memorandum from Secs. Indus. and Fin. Market Ass’n, to Martin J. Gruenberg on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, supra note 182.
185.
See generally Memorandum from Secs. Indus. and Fin. Market Ass’n, to the
Honorable Timothy Geithner on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans,
supra note 182; Memorandum from Am. Securitization Forum, to San Bernardino Cnty. Bd.
of Supervisors on Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement, supra note 9.
186.
See Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at
47,652.
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upward mobility and economic development.
While our ongoing national recovery from the collapse of the speculative housing bubble has proven
difficult, we should not abandon the underpinnings
of the market.187
Furthermore, “[t]he federal government has threatened to redline cities
and counties that engage in the practice, saying it could make it harder to
get loans and force lenders to levy additional fees as a safeguard against
government mortgage seizures.”188 On September 13, 2012, Representative
John Campbell of California introduced the Defending American Taxpayers
from Abusive Government Takings Act.189 In a press release he stated:
There is no question that we need to take steps to
assist American homeowners in distress . . . but,
these steps must not undermine rule of law, must
not engage in corruptive and abusive practices,
must protect the American taxpayer, and must not
further degrade the housing market. The eminent
domain programs in question are atrocious, corruptive, irresponsible and unconstitutional. We do
need to fix the housing sector, but it must be done
in a way that does not break the law and does not
enrich undeserving, politically-connected entities

187.
Memorandum from Secs. Indus. and Fin. Market Ass’n, to the Honorable Timothy Geithner on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, supra note 182,
at 3.
188.
See Nelson, supra note 80.
Senator William Proxmire, sponsor of legislation against redlining, put the case
this way:
By redlining let me make it clear what I am talking about. I am
talking about the fact that banks and savings and loans will
take their deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting then in that community, they will invest them elsewhere,
and they will actually or figuratively draw a red line in a map
around the areas of their city, sometimes in the inner city,
sometimes in the older neighborhoods, sometimes ethnic and
sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area of their
neighborhood.
THOMAS SOWELL, THE HOUSING BOOM AND BUST 113 (Basis Books rev. ed. 2009).
189.
John Campbell III, Campbell Introduces The Defending American Taxpayers
from Abusive Government Takings Act, PROJECT VOTE SMART (Jul. 18, 2013),
http://votesmart.org/public-statement/807369/campbell-introduces-the-defending-americantaxpayers-from-abusive-government-takings-act#.UjzisjYo74g.
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in cities and counties with unsustainable budget
deficits.190
Representative Campbell went on to state, “these programs will dramatically hurt the markets they are employed in as they will virtually destroy private lending in these cities and counties for years to come.”191 Representative Campbell’s bill did not pass, but odds are that the bill will be
put up for vote again in 2013.192 In addition, the concern is that “if the MRP
proposal spreads beyond San Bernardino County, the entire market for securitization of mortgage loans could be upended, as investors would never
know when a local government might try to seize desirable loans . . . .”193
Proponents of MRP’s proposal question the concern of SIFMA, ASF,
Representative Campbell, and other concerned organizations with respect to
the “chilling effect” that the use of eminent domain will have on the mortgage market.194 Proponents of MRP’s proposal state that the so-called
“chilling effect” is, in actuality, just concern for the loss of profits that
many holders of underwater mortgages would be forced to absorb if mortgages were seized and written down.195 As Representative Brad Miller of
North Carolina wrote, “[these concerns] convey[] the unmistakable threat
that Wall Street will sic its lawyers on . . . [San Bernardino] county and will
‘likely be reluctant to provide future funding to borrowers in these areas.’”196 Representative Miller goes on to state that the “threat of a boycott is
. . . hollow . . . . [Because a] threat of a boycott by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac would be credible, but the threat of a boycott by Wall Street is not.”197
Furthermore, MRP, in a comment letter to the FHFA, stated, with respect to
the “chilling effect” MRP’s plan may have, that “[l]enders will [now] price
this risk into future loans whether or not any local government actually exercises the power now, so there is no reason to impede the use of sovereign
power of eminent domain to mitigate losses now.”198 Obviously, there is
great disagreement over the alleged “chilling effect” that MRP’s proposal
will have on the market in general.199 However, the concern over a “chilling

190.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191.
Id.
192.
See Nelson, supra note 80.
193.
Dellinger et al., supra note 9, at 10.
194.
See Miller, supra note 13.
195.
See id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners, to Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency
on Federal Register Notice No. 2012-N-11, supra note 117, at 8.
199.
See Miller, supra note 13; Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners,
to Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency on Federal Register Notice No. 2012-N-11, supra note 117, at 8.
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effect” from MRP’s proposal will surely continue to be a concern voiced by
opponents to the plan.200
B.

TAXPAYERS WOULD BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOSSES INCURRED

The FHFA’s second major concern, that MRP’s plan could cause losses that would have to be absorbed by taxpayers, may not be as problematic
as the concerns over a “chilling effect” on the market.201 As stated earlier,
the FHFA is concerned that implementation of MRP’s plan has the possibility to cause significant losses for taxpayers.202 The FHFA is deeply concerned about this issue because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed
into conservatorship under the FHFA on September 6, 2008.203 Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are GSEs that “play a critical role in the U.S. home mortgage market . . . .”204 As conservator to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
[T]he FHFA has taken over the assets and assumed
all the powers of the shareholders, directors, and
officers. It may take any necessary action to restore
the firms to a sound and solvent condition . . . .
GSE business operations will continue as before; . .
. . The conservatorship will end when the FHFA
finds that a safe and solvent condition has been restored.205
For this reason, the FHFA is particularly concerned with any actions
that may affect the mortgage market.206 In addition, “[s]ince establishing
conservatorships for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) in
2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Enterprises
have focused on three key goals [including] mitigating Enterprise losses,
which ultimately accrue to taxpayers . . . .”207 It is for these reasons that the
200.
See Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg.
47,652 (Aug. 9, 2012).
201.
See id.; Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners to Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency on Federal Register Notice No. 2012-N-11, supra note 117, at 7-8.
202.
See Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at
47,652.
203.
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, FHFA SENDS CONGRESS STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC CONSERVATORSHIPS 1 (Feb. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23344/StrategicPlanConservatorshipsFINAL.pdf.
204.
Mark Jickling, CRS Report for Congress: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in
Conservatorship, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (Sept. 15, 2008),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110097.pdf.
205.
Id. at 3.
206.
See Jickling, supra note 204, at 1.
207.
FEDERAL HOUSE FINANCE AGENCY, supra note 203, at 2.
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FHFA stated in the Federal Register on August 9, 2012, “FHFA has significant concerns about the use of eminent domain to revise existing financial
contracts and the alteration of the value of [Government Sponsored] Enterprise or Bank securities holdings.”208
However, the FHFA’s concerns may be misdirected.209 MRP stated in
a comment letter to the FHFA that “[l]ocal governments must pay fair value
for all mortgage loans and therefore will not cause any losses. All losses
have in fact already occurred because of the disastrous collapse of housing
prices in affected communities.”210 However, this simply is a return to the
argument over fair value versus market value, which was discussed in Part
IV.A.II.211 Therefore, the question of whether losses will be borne by taxpayers upon implementation of MRP’s proposal will truly be determined by
the question of whether mortgage holders will be given fair value or market
value.212 If the mortgage holders are given market value, they may not be
provided “just compensation.”213 If the mortgage holders were given fair
value rather than market value, it would increase the likelihood of taxpayers
being subject to the risk of increased losses.214 In the end, the question of
the level and amount of losses taxpayers could be liable for will continue to
be an important policy concern of MRP’s proposal.215
Finally, there is also the issue of what has come to be known as “moral
hazard.”216 “Moral hazard . . . refers to the undue risks that people are apt to
take if they don’t have to bear the consequences.”217 Therefore, in a housing
market context, the concern is that “[c]utting the loan balance of a troubled
homeowner will only encourage future borrowers to take on debts they
can’t pay back . . . .”218 MRP disagrees with the concerns over “moral haz208.
Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652
(Aug. 9, 2012).
209.
See Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners to Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency on Federal Register Notice No. 2012-N-11, supra note 117, at 5.
210.
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213.
See Grossman, supra note 9, at 2.
214.
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See id.
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ard.”219 MRP has stated, “America is facing an economic crisis and the solution requires practical action that keeps people in their homes . . . . The
real moral hazard is that the system is forcing homeowners to default in
order to achieve rational solutions.”220 However, MRP fails to state how
their proposal would not constitute a “moral hazard,” and therefore, the
concern over “moral hazard” will continue to be a position voiced by opponents to the plan.221
VI.

CONCLUSION

Considering the legal and policy issues with respect to MRP’s plan,
the question becomes whether the proposal will go any further.222 As stated
in Part I, San Bernardino County was one local government that had been
considering MRP’s plan.223 However, the county decided to scrap that plan
in response to heightened public disapproval.224 The disapproval in San
Bernardino was most likely more than a vocal minority based on an informal internet survey conducted on November 27, 2012 the results of which
showed that:225 “of 113 Californians, 96 percent . . . said they oppose[d]
eminent domain to seize mortgages because they didn't believe it would
stabilize housing prices. In addition, the majority of those surveyed felt that
borrowers understood the risks they assumed when they bought their
homes.”226 Clearly, there are some reservations held by the public over the
use of eminent domain to correct the foreclosure crisis.227 This is not even
considering the legal challenges that would ensue upon the implementation
of the plan by local governments and MRP.228 Therefore, it remains to be
seen whether MRP’s proposal will ever actually be put into operation.229
Considering the fact that a court could halt a local government’s implementation of MRP’s proposal for just one of the many legal issues mentioned
above, the odds are not in favor of successful implementation of the plan in
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the future.230 Furthermore, considering the policy concerns being voiced
about the plan, it would appear that future implementation of MRP’s proposal by a local government will be an uphill battle, at best.231
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